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Abstract
This paper discloses a simple algorithm for encrypting text messages, based
on the NP-completeness of the subset sum problem, such that the similarity
between encryptions is roughly proportional to the semantic similarity between
their generating messages. This allows parties to compare encrypted messages
for semantic overlap without trusting an intermediary and might be applied,
for example, as a means of finding scientific collaborators over the Internet.
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1 Introduction
There is an unavoidable trade-off between security of a text encryption scheme and
its general utility: highly-secure encryption schemes (e.g. PGP [1]) are only useful
as a means of communication between pre-designated parties with access to the
appropriate keys; at the other extreme, completely unencrypted text is optimal for
search engines and public forums, but by definition obviously not secure. One might
wonder whether it is possible to find an encryption scheme that achieves a favorable
compromise, being secure enough to guarantee a comfortable level of privacy while
retaining some ability to sample semantic content, if only relative to other messages.
This paper explicitly introduces one such scheme wherein semantic similarity between
messages is deduced by direct comparison of the encrypted messages.
Communication among humans has de facto always been one of two extreme
forms: exclusive privacy or public openness. Yet in recent years there is a grow-
ing community researching a new paradigm wherein multiple parties submit private
data to a collective pool which returns a public result, and this has come to be called
“Secure Multi-party Computation” (SMPC). The classic work in SMPC has to be
A. Yao’s “Millionaire Problem” [2], which defines an algorithmic procedure for two
individuals to determine which among them is the richer without disclosing the indi-
vidual wealth of either. In this case the private data is wealth and the public result
is simply a boolean number (Yao then generalizes to m parties collectively comput-
ing a public function f(x1, ..., xm)). SMPC has most conspicuously been applied in
a Danish sugar beet double auction [3] among farmers and a single buyer, wherein
the private data (farmers’ bids and buyer’s offer) were encrypted and processed to
determine an equilibrium price by matching respective supply and demand curves.
Though these examples of SMPC would suggest its limitation to straight numeri-
cal applications, the premises of SMPC — multiple parties submitting secure data
which is publicly digestible to produce a particular result — are quite general and
should apply to a wide range of problems. In particular, SMPC should be a good
framework for a text encryption scheme that enjoys both security and comparability.
The private data in such a case would be the individual messages, while the public
result might be a partitioning of all parties into groups of similar interests.
A good application of this scheme would be the problem of finding scientific
collaborators. Traditionally, one attempts to find potential collaborators by proposal
to selected parties, but this suffers from the fact that the more esoteric the idea, the
wider the net of disclosure that must be cast to find a suitable number of potential
collaborators, yet the breadth of the net is also proportional to the chance of seeding
competing teams and thus potentially being ‘scooped’. On the other hand, if the
research proposal were securely submitted in a SMPC protocol as discussed above
and the public partitioning of groups indicated several parties in the group, only those
parties would know something about the nature of the proposal and the chance of
seeding competitors would be negligible2. Members of a group could then iterate
2There is also something novel that is unachievable by traditional means here: if there were no
other parties in the group, then the proposal could be certified as unique without exposing it at all.
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the procedure among themselves to resolve the degree of commonality, pursuing
collaboration if desired.
In order to apply SMPC to the processing of text messages, however, one needs a
quantitative framework that converts words into something that can be ‘computed’.
The approach which we will employ in this paper is to define the relationships between
words in a semantic network wherein words with similar meanings are neighboring
nodes connected by a link, and the semantic similarity of any two words can be
taken to be proportional to the minimal number of links separating them. Such a
network is straightforward to construct from Princeton University’s WordNet [4], a
publicly-available lexical database of English nouns, verbs, adverbs, and adjectives,
where semantic relationships between all of these are defined systematically in a
collection of cross-referenced files. In the context of the technique considered in this
paper, it is not even important what the precise definitions of the words are — the
semantic network already contains enough information to quantitatively compare two
messages in terms of a sort of aggregate nodal separation.
Though we shall choose English as “the language” in this paper, it should be
understood that the discussion applies to any language in which messages are com-
posed of discrete elements, be they words, kanji, or hieroglyphs. As tools comparable
to WordNet become available in such languages, the technique of this paper will be
equally applicable there.
In the next section we will describe the setup and algorithm, which for some
researchers will already suffice to derive the rest of the results in this paper. Further
practical results relevant to actual usage appear in Section 3, and we will go on to
discuss the issue of security in Section 4. Section 5 contains numerical results applied
to actual messages generated with WordNet, giving a flavor of the likely usefulness
of the proposed algorithm in a public setting, and we will finally consider a few
generalizations and extensions in Section 6.
2 Encryption
2.1 The Dictionary and Thesaurus
As a preliminary step, we will need a dictionary D that maps each word in the lan-
guage to a unique integer valued in the range [0, Imax], for some large positive integer
Imax. Also, we will need a master thesaurus T with the following two properties:
1. Each entry in T maps a word w from D to a set of integers Ωw, called the
“synset of w”. Each integer in Ωw corresponds to a word closely related to w,
and the j-th member of this set is denoted Ωwj .
2. Given any three words x, y, and z, if x is semantically closer to y than to z,
then |Ωx ∩ Ωy| > |Ωx ∩ Ωz|.
Whereas the first condition above is satisfied by just about any thesaurus, the second
condition enforces a mathematical relation among words which allows us to gauge
closeness of meaning without even knowing the language.
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One real example3 of T is WordNet [4], representing semantic connections among
roughly 1.5·105 English words with Imax = 2.0·107. Figure 1 shows the distribution of
synsets over all the words in T. Evidently the most probable synset size of a random
English word in this dictionary is 2 (this includes the original word). However, as
there is a very long tail4 to this distribution5, the mean size of a synset actually turns
out to be about 10.
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Figure 1: Distribution of synsets from WordNet 3.0. Although the peak of this distribution
occurs at 2, there is a very long tail (most of which is not shown) that pushes the mean
synset size to 10.
3A toy example might be a dictionary of the following three words and their synsets: x = “dog”,
y = “cat”, and z = “rock”, with Ωx = {2, 11, 13}, Ωy = {2, 11, 15}, and Ωz = {2, 33, 52}. Since
“dog” is semantically closer to “cat” than to “rock”, |Ωx ∩ Ωy| = 2 > |Ωx ∩Ωz | = 1.
4“Run”, for example, has a synset of size 575, which includes integers representing “play”,
“streak”, and “function”. The three largest synsets in WordNet 3.0, which in some sense repre-
sent the ‘most-connected’ words of the English language, are “change” (2427), “move” (1388), and
“law” (1209).
5A WordNet “synset” actually comes in several different varieties, e.g. hypernym, hyponym,
antonym, etc. The “synset” defined in this paper, on the other hand, includes only words which
are in direct positive relation to the parent word, and so excludes the antonym entries, for example.
Also, whereas the WordNet synsets might be described as words ‘1-link-separated’ from the parent
word, the synsets in this paper consist of words ‘up-to-2-links-separated’ from the parent word, and
are thus larger.
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In addition, we will need a rule for handling words outside D proper: although
the simplest rule is to just ignore such words, a more useful possibility is to hash
each such word to a unique integer not currently in the synset of any other word. If
x is such a word, then, |Ωx| = 1 and |Ωx ∩ Ωy| = 0 for x 6= y.
2.2 The Algorithm
Assuming that we now have a dictionary and thesaurus as defined above, we present
below the encryption algorithm in its generality, and then specialize to the simplest
and most practical case for the remainder of this paper.
We will assume the “Bag of Words” model wherein word order, grammar, and
punctuation are ignored and the message of interest is simply taken to consist of a
collection of N words with synsets Ωi (1 ≤ i ≤ N). Then, for a given n ≥ 1, the
encrypted form of the message is
Sn ≡ {Ωi1p1 + Ωi2p2 + ...+ Ωinpn}1≤i1<i2<...<in≤N ; p1,p2,...pn (1)
that is, the set of all integers formed by summing integers n-at-a-time, each from a
unique synset6. We will christen this “n-Sum encryption”.
The case of n = 2 is the simplest case relevant to this paper7, which can be
rewritten as
S2 ≡ {Ωip + Ωjq}i<j; p,q (2)
The rest of this article focuses on S2, though the reader should keep in mind that
the security of Sn increases with n, and this will be investigated further in Section 4.
3 Usage
3.1 General Usage
Usage of the n-Sum encryption algorithm would ideally follow a model wherein the
only public component is a large fileserver configured such that all users have down-
load/upload (but not overwrite) privileges. In the simplest scheme, each file, uncom-
pressed, contains a list of integers corresponding to S2 for some messsage
8. Message
encryption and analysis of any number of files downloaded would then be entirely
client-side9.
Once a user downloads a set of messages to analyze, there are two simple analyt-
ical operations to glean information about message content:
6One also has the option of removing duplicate elements from Sn, which makes the algorithm
somewhat more secure at the cost of some accuracy in utility.
7The case n = 1 suffers from being almost trivial to decrypt, but still useful, for example, to
transform a message into a list of all its words’ synonyms.
8The filepath + name could optionally point to the message author as well.
9In this model the server should not be trusted with these tasks, but the author makes available
an explicit example combining server-side encryption, storage, and analysis [5].
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1. Total Matching. As a first-order estimate of message similarity, it suffices to
compare the intersection of the messages’ sets to the sets proper:
ξS′S ≡ |S2 ∩ S
′
2|
|S2| (3)
indicates the fractional extent to which S is contained in S ′.
2. Word-Pair Matching. As any pair of words (x, y) can define a set Sxy ≡ {Ωxp+
Ωyq}p,q containing |Sxy| = |Ωx||Ωy| integers, one can define a figure of merit
ζxy representing the fractional semantic coverage of this word pair in the target
message. Specifically,
ζxy ≡ |Sxy ∩ S2||Sxy| (4)
Clearly if the target message contains the words x and y, then ζxy = 1, while
ζxy < 1 indicates only partial semantic coverage of the word pair. This will
be qualified by coincidental matching due to collisions with other words, the
likelihood of which increases as saturation is approached (see below).
It is important to note that the only messages which will reveal any information
about their content are those which already share some similarity (in the sense of (3)
or (4)) with the user’s message(s).
3.2 Saturation
As each word maps to a set of integers Ωw valued in the range [0, Imax], S2 will
clearly be valued in the interval [0, 2Imax]. The above matching algorithm will start
to lose effectiveness if S2 densely populates this interval, for then the probability of
coincidental matching approaches unity. As a quick estimate of how large a message
can become before giving rise to this “saturation” effect, note that an N-word message
will contain N(N−1)
2
word pairs, and if each word has a synset of average size ω, each
word pair will on average contribute ω2 integers to S2. The condition for avoiding
saturation is thus
N(N − 1)
2
ω2 ≪ 2Imax (5)
⇒ N ≪ 2
√
Imax
ω
(6)
in the large N limit (N ≫ 1). In our WordNet setup, ω ≈ 10 (see Section 2.1 above),
Imax = 2.0 · 107, and thus we require N ≪ 894. Typical “tweet”-like messages are
often closer to N ≈ 20, and even scientific abstracts don’t go much beyond N ≈ 100
or so, thus saturation should not be a significant constraint for normal usage10. In
Section 5 below, we will quantitatively verify this.
10One could also simply redefine D with a larger Imax to reduce saturation effects.
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4 Security
As noted previously, n-Sum encryption sacrifices some security in order to be useful as
a message-comparing protocol. However, this does not mean that decryption is easy
or even within reach of existing computational power; indeed it is straightforward to
step up the security level of the algorithm to surpass any given computational power
by increasing n.
Decryption of Sn is almost certainly as hard as the classic NP-complete “subset
sum problem”: given a set of integers X, find a non-empty subset whose sum is zero.
In the present case, the elements of Sn are sums of n integers from D, and inversion
would thus require solving a subset sum problem on D. Using all the information in
Sn as a series of coupled equations for an assumed number of generating words and
synset sizes is probably harder than simply conducting a brute-force search on various
n-word combinations from D. To crack an S2 encryption, for example, one would need
to compute Sxy for each pair of words (x, y) in D and compare to the encryption set
S2 to test for set inclusion. For the WordNet dictionary with N = 1.5 · 105 words,
there are N(N−1)
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≈ 1010 word pairs; matching against a modest-sized encryption
(say a list of 105 integers) on a typical personal computer(Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz, 4.00 GB RAM) proceeds at O(102) word pairs per second,
which would thus take months of computation to find the first matching pair. Note,
however, that finding subsequent pairs is much faster since one can use one of the
words found in the first pair and thus need only search over O(N) possible partner
words in D. There are certainly ways to enhance the efficiency of this procedure,
most obviously by parallel computation, but also by cataloguing all word-pairs in a
database with optimized search algorithms, so S2 is not expected to be highly secure
in this regard11.
The difficulty of decrypting Sn rapidly increases with n, however. At the next
level encrypting triplets of words, a brute force attack on S3 requires a search on a
space already 5 orders of magnitude larger, which pushes decryption to the realm
of supercomputers. S4 is another 5 orders of magnitude larger and probably secure
against any civilian computational power12. Of course, using Sn-level encryption
requires that one has at least n words in the generating message, and saturation
effects also increase with n. Generalizing the previous result (5) for Sn, again in the
large N limit, we would require
N ≪ (2nImax)
1/n
ω
(7)
Of course we must also have N ≥ n, else there wouldn’t be enough words in the
message to form a combination of n words. For the WordNet dictionary we are
11On the other hand, there are a number of things one can do to enhance security: using specialized
words outside the dictionary, using a customized dictionary, or, as noted previously, eliminating
duplicate entries from S2 all make it harder to test set inclusion.
12A brute-force decryption would have to search all 4-word combinations in the dictionary, of
which there are
(
105
4
)
≈ 1018.
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using, n = 4 thus requires N ≤ 10, and n > 4 is ruled out. It turns out we can
escape these constraints by simply reassigning dictionary values to increase Imax,
but it is anyways useful to be aware of this in advance.
5 Numerical Tests
A few numerical ‘experiments’ with S2 should lead credence to the some of the above
claims and demonstrate practicality of n-Sum encryption as a message-comparing
protocol.
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Figure 2: Percent overlap (100× ξS′S) between members of 1000 random pairs of uncorre-
lated 20-word messages. As expected, the average overlap is quite small.
First, we test to what extent random messages overlap in the Total Matching
sense of Section 3. From a random sample of 1000 pairs of 20-word messages, Figure
2 shows that the overwhelming majority of message pairs have less than 0.5 percent
overlap as defined by ξS′S in (3), with the most probable overlap being about 0.05
percent. This generally holds true for longer messages too (up to 50 words long),
and only slowly approaches an average 1 percent overlap with 100-word messages.
Thus, in actual usage a level of 1 percent overlap or less generally indicates unrelated
messages, which makes intuitive sense. Note this also demonstrates that saturation
effects are negligible for even modest-sized messages.
As the next check, we repeat the above analysis for a sample of 1000 pairs of
related 20-word messages, where each word in the second message in each pair is
randomly chosen from one of the synsets of the first message’s words. Referring to
Figure 3, we see that the typical message pair exhibits a significant overlap — about
7
44 percent on average — and this again makes intuitive sense. Presumably if a user
were to discover overlap of this magnitude between messages S and S ′, the next step
would be to identify the individual words responsible for the overlap with (4).
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Figure 3: Percent overlap between members of 1000 random pairs of related messages. The
peak and average value are roughly 44 percent.
Note that in these experiments the messages were randomly selected from words
in D; in actual practice where a user’s message may contain punctuation, special
characters, and stop words, for example, one would need to parse the message into
an appropriate collection of words.
Finally, let us comment on the storage space required for these messages. An
N-word message encrypted with Sn is essentially a list of
Nn
n
ωn 32-bit integers, which
ought to be highly compressible, at least to the level of 1 byte per integer13. For
S2, in particular, there are thus about 50N
2 bytes in an N-word message, i.e. 20 kB
for a 20-word message. Although this is clearly larger than the space required to
store unencrypted text (20 words at 6 chars per word ≈ 120 bytes), most personal
hard-drives should easily be able to store millions of messages.
13For example, we can record the lowest 32-bit integer and then a 10-bit offset plus one ap-
pend/separator bit per integer from there. This already gives a reduction from the naive 4 bytes
per integer to about 11 bits ≈ 1.5 bytes per integer, and there are surely more ingenious schemes
one can employ.
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6 Conclusion
Recent times have witnessed greatly increased public desire for personal data privacy,
yet too much encryption hinders the many services, e.g. social networking, that users
expect to work quickly and effectively over the Internet. The method proposed in this
paper attempts to strike a balance: n-Sum encryption is easily user-implementable
without very sophisticated mathematics, configurably secure in a straightforward
fashion, and potentially useful as a message-comparison scheme to find or expand
one’s social network.
Though we mentioned how n-Sum encryption may be used in the context of
scientific collaboration, there are certainly many more avenues of application: e.g.
corporate/political negotiation, community organizing, and advertising to name a
few [5]. Indeed, it would not be surprising that the transition from current modes of
communication based on either purely private or purely public methods to commu-
nication based upon SMPC would broadly revolutionize how humans interact with
each other using the Internet14.
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